I, too, will submit more extensive comments for the

record——

[continuing]. and present only an abbreviated version.

Mr. Chairman, the obvious problem that the United States faces

today with regard to Iraq is that we have no perfect option toward

Iraq. There are policies we can adopt that would solve the problems

of Saddam Hussein forever, but they come at a price we may be

loath to pay. There are policies we could adopt that would come at

an acceptable price, but they offer no permanent solution, at least

not in the short term.

Indeed, it is this conundrum that drove us to containment of Iraq

after the Gulf War just as similar conundrums drove us to accept

the containment of the Soviet Union, of Communist China, of

North Korea, and of Cuba, in their time.

I, too, share popular frustrations with containment of Iraq. I, too,

would like to find ways to get rid of Saddam Hussein quickly, but

I am forced to accept the logic that containment is the best course

of action toward Iraq. For better or worse, containment is our only

reasonable course of action toward Iraq at present. Indeed, even a

more aggressive policy toward Iraq would have to build off the base

of containment.

Unless we choose to give up on Iraq and accommodate Saddam,

or else invade the country, any policy toward Iraq will simply be

a variant of containment.

At this point in time, I think we have to rule out either accommodating

Saddam or invading Iraq. Everything we are left with is

a variant of containment in some way or another. Even the idea

of supporting the Iraqi opposition against Saddam is just going to

be an adjunct of a containment policy rather than an alternative

to it.

It would take a tremendous effort on the part of the United

States, including hundreds of millions of dollars and several years,

to reform, reorganize, rearm, and retrain the Iraqi opposition to the

point where it could return to Iraq as a credible opposition. During

the years it would require to support an Iraqi opposition capable

of effective operations inside Iraq the United States would still

have to keep Saddam weak and isolated through containment.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, we would return inevitably to containment

at all times, not because it is the best policy, but because it is the

least worst option we have available to us.

Nevertheless, while it is clear that the United States will have

to rely on some form of containment, it is equally clear that we

cannot continue with business as usual. We are reaching a point

where we must act to restore containment, to bolster it so that it

can last over the long term.

Containment is under attack from a variety of directions, and

these attacks are doing real damage. We are already being forced

to make concessions in some areas of the containment regime in

order to hold the line on others. In the future, to make containment

last we will have to make additional tradeoffs.

The question that the United States must answer is, what kind

of a containment regime do we want to have, and what tradeoffs

are we willing to make?

Essentially, there are two different sets of tradeoffs we could

make to bolster containment. On the one hand, we could make

tradeoffs among our various foreign policy agendas. We could make

concessions on some foreign policy issues in hope of securing greater

cooperation from our allies on Iraq.

On the other hand, we could make tradeoffs within our Iraq policy.

We could make concessions on some aspects of the sanctions

and inspections regimes in order to lock in other, more important

mechanisms for the long-term.

The former option I call broad containment. The goal of this approach

would be to preserve the current sanctions against Iraq intact

and in toto. There is real reason to try to preserve containment

as it currently exists.

Simply put, the containment of Iraq we have held in place over

the last 7 years is the most far-reaching and effective the modern

world has seen. Bad-mouth it though we may, fret over Saddam’s

noncompliance though we may, the sanctions and inspections regimes

established after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait have been remarkably

successful.

Iraq’s military continues to wither. UNSCOM has obliterated

vast quantities of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and, ultimately,

Baghdad remains isolated. If we can find a way to keep

this policy intact and hold it together over the long-term, we should

do so.

Unfortunately, it is the very strength and comprehensiveness of

broad containment that has created our problem. It is the effectiveness

of this containment regime that provokes Baghdad to fight it

so ferociously, and that causes France, Russia, China, and so many

other States to increasingly oppose it. Consequently, if we are

going to keep containment this strong and this comprehensive, we

will have to be willing to make very significant sacrifices on other

issues to hold it together.

Ultimately, Iraq is not a primary foreign policy concern for

France, nor is it for Russia, nor for China, or Egypt, or most countries

in the world. For most of the world, Iraq is less important to

them than it is to the United States.

On the other hand, there are policy issues that matter far more

to these other countries than does Iraq. Consequently, if the United

States is going to hold on to broad containment of Iraq, it will have

to be willing to make concessions to other States on foreign policy

issues more important to them than Iraq.

If we are unwilling to make sacrifices on other foreign policy

issues to try to persuade other nations to be more cooperative on

Iraq, the alternative is to make concessions within the containment

regime itself.

The option I will call narrow containment would tradeoff the

more comprehensive aspects of the sanctions currently in existence

in return for a new set of international agreements locking in the

most important aspects of containment over the long term.

There are four areas that are crucial to the continued containment

of Iraq over the long-term, limiting Iraq’s conventional military,

preventing Iraq from acquiring weapons of mass destruction,

maintaining Iraq’s diplomatic isolation, and monitoring Iraqi

spending.

A policy of narrow containment would envision trading off other

aspects of the current containment regime in return for locking in

regulations that will allow containment of Iraq to continue in these

four areas. It would envision new international agreements reaffirming

the prohibition on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,

banning the sale of offensive conventional weaponry to Iraq, and

reaffirming the inviability of Iraq’s international borders.

Now, depending on what the international community would be

able to agree to under a policy of narrow containment, the United

States would have to be prepared to make concessions on Iraqi imports

and exports other than arms and dual use technology, frozen

assets, the no-fly zones, the no-drive zones, flight bans, Iraqi compensation

to its victims, and even the return of Kuwaiti property

stolen during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

Mr. Chairman, to summarize and conclude, although we do not

have any perfect options toward Iraq, we cannot afford not to

choose among those we have. Because of the pressures on the current

sanctions and inspections regime and because of the compromises

we have already been forced to make in response to those

pressures, simply muddling through, of which I am often a proponent,

will not do.

The United States has no choice but to employ some variant of

containment, but we must decide which variant we will employ. We

must develop a cohesive strategy to implement it, and we must devote

all necessary attention and resources toward executing it.

Our Iraq policy faces considerable challenges, but it is hardly

dead. If we do not give it the attention and resources it requires,

containment will continue to erode, and 1 day we could wake up

with no choice but to either invade Iraq or accommodate Saddam.

However, there is every reason to believe that containment can

be reformed and made to last over the long term. We Americans

do not like containment, but we happen to be very good at it. We

contained the Soviet Union for 45 years, until it collapsed. We continue

to contain both Cuba and North Korea with relatively little

effort. All of these States were far more formidable adversaries

than Iraq will ever be.

Mr. Chairman, there is no reason we cannot continue to contain

Iraq as we contain these other rogue States, as long as we make

the effort to do so.

Thank you, Senator Robb.

Let me begin by saying that I think it is critical that we do explore

these kinds of alternatives to containment. Nevertheless, you

have heard me say that ultimately right now I do not think we do

have a good alternative to containment.

That is not to say that we should not have a more aggressive

containment policy along the lines of the policy suggested by Dr.

Kay and Mr. Perle, but the problem that I am trying to focus a bit

of attention on here is that any of these suggestions are going to

take time to unfold, and during that period of time we are going

to have to rely on containment to hold the line. We have to play

defense at the same time that we buildup an offensive option, if we

are to buildup an offensive option against Saddam.

My concern is that right now we look very hard at containment,

because as we are all in agreement here, the current approach to

containment is not succeeding. It is eroding, and I think we need

to make some very hard choices about how we are going to restructure

containment and make it last over the long term.

And the worst of all possible worlds is that at some point in the

future we do adopt either a more aggressive policy toward Saddam,

or we discover an alternative to containment, only to find that we

have so badly allowed containment to erode that when we finally

get around to putting in place this new policy, it is impossible, because

all the support is gone and Saddam is out of his box.